Enron was a bucket full of exactly that. A constant stream of ideas projected to go vertical, absorbed again and again into new rocket ships, never having to show year on year results.
As Buffett has said often, when the tide goes out you discover who is swimming naked.
I dunno, that's a tough one for a government to backstop. Banks? Sure, BTDT. Money funds? Sort of (there's your accounting rules part, and then expanded guarantee). Backstops in the GFC were geared toward preventing funds built upon (mostly) "money good" assets from getting blown out by runs. This is different, different vehicles, very little retail exposure. My guess is no bail outs.
Fund managers who face accelerated redemptions and who can't sell what they want, usually are forced to sell what they can. Hopefully some of these assets are liquid enough to tide them over. The long maturities of a lot of this stuff suggests that may not be the case. Still, there are always bottom feeders willing to buy at a discount. The unresolved question is whether the discounted redemption price is offset by the above market returns already received. This tends to favor those who got in first, like a lot of scams we have seen over time.
The interesting aspect of this credit cycle is that due to increased regulation and capital requirements overseen by strict regulators and examiners the mega banks could not fund these loans profitable , which is why the private credit markets grew so rapidly. So the mega banks exposure is limited to their providing funding for domestic of the private credit originators, , but to the extent that occurred it was undoubtedly at the senior level.
Thus, what this cycle will reveal is who among the sponsors of the private credit vehicles kept their credit standards strict enough to not suffer too much damage when the bubble inevitably deflates, particularly if , or perhaps inevitably when, it goes from a slow leak to rapid deflation of the bubble.
But I am in Bill Nygren’s camp, at thus time this is not a systemic problem. What would likely cause it to lead to a widespread economic slowdown or recession caused by a prolonged period of high energy prices due to a prolonged Iranian conflict or some other actions due either to the increasing hubris of our “ no new wars” president or one of the other generally incompetent political leaders around the world.
Absent such a slowdown or extreme shock to the system ( think Xi deciding to invade Taiwan) , I think that any “credit crisis “ and resultant flight to safety and illiquidity which might result will in all likelihood stop well short of a contagion that would spread to the banking system. For even many of the major players in this market, e.g BLK, BX, BAM, KKR, , etc, this lending is not a large enough part of their business to really put them in financial distress, although it would certainly give any of them who lose substantial money for their investors a painful black eye and cause a lot of indigestion for their stockholders . Once again as in many other cars recently, the “smart, sophisticated “ institutional investors might be hit much harder and the “dumb” retail investor.
Since everyone is getting tarred with the same brush, I have actually been adding to some of my financial positions lately, since I had lightened up a few months ago when they all spiked up and got way overbought. In all but a bear market caused by a weak economy and downward earnings estimate revisions I now view the risk/reward as skewing positive. A few examples, during Tuesday’s rout I thought that BRK, C and AIG ( stocks which I have owned for years) all became pretty attractive.
First it was the debt repricing from zero bound base interest rates crashing into an inconvenient debt cliff of a refinancing the sponsor never contemplated coming. At the same time, the debt of such wonderful company is 5X EBITDA itself that once had an ample DSC that has now collapsed when refinancing debt holders demanded double the coupon to refi. Next the BDC that thought it prudent to only leverage itself 1:1 only to now find the underlying wonderful business cash flow starved and leveraged 10X at the BDC level. This is when things get interesting and a man's character and tolerance for anxiety and pain become challenged. Now the nifty low leveraged BDC itself needs to refi or raise equity for it too is hitting a debt cliff that it never saw coming when it raised debt initially in a zero rate bound world. Equity Investors wake up and begin to take note. Sensing a whiff of panic, panicked investors send shares of the BDC to a huge discounts to an NAV that never seem to move. Cheap becomes cheaper by the day. Sadly the sponsor, by rule, cannot raise equity at a discount to NAV, find themselves cutting dividend payouts that can no longer be supported nor justified. The smart operators will sell hard and fast and deleverage if they can. The first few bids are precious.The first debt trades on yield, then bid lists come in and trade on price, and finally not at all in the worst of markets. Never say hope is a strategy, because at this stage, strategy is both hope and prayers. Real panic sets in when there are no bids at all and liquidity evaporates. Defaults no one saw coming set in to the point where everything trades like it is going out of business. Panic has manifested itself.
You never know how far these things go but these bad environments take on a life of their own. They change how those involved see themselves, their businesses and the risk they have really taken on. They change the man.
This cycle appears to have just begun. A lot depends on how far it goes.
Hard to imagine a $25MM note lacked any recoverable collateral at all. Maybe the cost and delay of recovery nets a zero.
The holders of private credit notes and shares waded into their positions looking for above market yields. To provide this required the borrowers to pay above market rates. No borrower who can find a lower rate would do this. The choice to pay more comes from a general market assessment that the risk is too great. So it's a fundamental reality that the higher rates paid to investors come at the inescapable cost of greater risk.
The private credit bundlers sell, apparently, to buyers without the scale to do meaningful due diligence on the individual risks their money is exposed to. But the larger forces of Mr. Market signaled possible trouble in the better returns promised. These are grown ups, one would hope, and they understand that long lockups mean untimely redemptions might come at a penalty.
I am starting to feel bad that I did not come up with some bullshit idea that I could sell these PE people, and then walk away with the cash.
Me too
Enron was a bucket full of exactly that. A constant stream of ideas projected to go vertical, absorbed again and again into new rocket ships, never having to show year on year results.
As Buffett has said often, when the tide goes out you discover who is swimming naked.
That might justifiably be characterized as sub-prime.
I don’t see this administration letting capitalism take its course, instead it will be socialism for the losing funds.
So if these write downs continue and escalate, what does a bailout look like? Relaxing accounting rules? Just print money?
Agree. Probably both.
I dunno, that's a tough one for a government to backstop. Banks? Sure, BTDT. Money funds? Sort of (there's your accounting rules part, and then expanded guarantee). Backstops in the GFC were geared toward preventing funds built upon (mostly) "money good" assets from getting blown out by runs. This is different, different vehicles, very little retail exposure. My guess is no bail outs.
Fund managers who face accelerated redemptions and who can't sell what they want, usually are forced to sell what they can. Hopefully some of these assets are liquid enough to tide them over. The long maturities of a lot of this stuff suggests that may not be the case. Still, there are always bottom feeders willing to buy at a discount. The unresolved question is whether the discounted redemption price is offset by the above market returns already received. This tends to favor those who got in first, like a lot of scams we have seen over time.
The interesting aspect of this credit cycle is that due to increased regulation and capital requirements overseen by strict regulators and examiners the mega banks could not fund these loans profitable , which is why the private credit markets grew so rapidly. So the mega banks exposure is limited to their providing funding for domestic of the private credit originators, , but to the extent that occurred it was undoubtedly at the senior level.
Thus, what this cycle will reveal is who among the sponsors of the private credit vehicles kept their credit standards strict enough to not suffer too much damage when the bubble inevitably deflates, particularly if , or perhaps inevitably when, it goes from a slow leak to rapid deflation of the bubble.
But I am in Bill Nygren’s camp, at thus time this is not a systemic problem. What would likely cause it to lead to a widespread economic slowdown or recession caused by a prolonged period of high energy prices due to a prolonged Iranian conflict or some other actions due either to the increasing hubris of our “ no new wars” president or one of the other generally incompetent political leaders around the world.
Absent such a slowdown or extreme shock to the system ( think Xi deciding to invade Taiwan) , I think that any “credit crisis “ and resultant flight to safety and illiquidity which might result will in all likelihood stop well short of a contagion that would spread to the banking system. For even many of the major players in this market, e.g BLK, BX, BAM, KKR, , etc, this lending is not a large enough part of their business to really put them in financial distress, although it would certainly give any of them who lose substantial money for their investors a painful black eye and cause a lot of indigestion for their stockholders . Once again as in many other cars recently, the “smart, sophisticated “ institutional investors might be hit much harder and the “dumb” retail investor.
Since everyone is getting tarred with the same brush, I have actually been adding to some of my financial positions lately, since I had lightened up a few months ago when they all spiked up and got way overbought. In all but a bear market caused by a weak economy and downward earnings estimate revisions I now view the risk/reward as skewing positive. A few examples, during Tuesday’s rout I thought that BRK, C and AIG ( stocks which I have owned for years) all became pretty attractive.
The down cycle begins.
First it was the debt repricing from zero bound base interest rates crashing into an inconvenient debt cliff of a refinancing the sponsor never contemplated coming. At the same time, the debt of such wonderful company is 5X EBITDA itself that once had an ample DSC that has now collapsed when refinancing debt holders demanded double the coupon to refi. Next the BDC that thought it prudent to only leverage itself 1:1 only to now find the underlying wonderful business cash flow starved and leveraged 10X at the BDC level. This is when things get interesting and a man's character and tolerance for anxiety and pain become challenged. Now the nifty low leveraged BDC itself needs to refi or raise equity for it too is hitting a debt cliff that it never saw coming when it raised debt initially in a zero rate bound world. Equity Investors wake up and begin to take note. Sensing a whiff of panic, panicked investors send shares of the BDC to a huge discounts to an NAV that never seem to move. Cheap becomes cheaper by the day. Sadly the sponsor, by rule, cannot raise equity at a discount to NAV, find themselves cutting dividend payouts that can no longer be supported nor justified. The smart operators will sell hard and fast and deleverage if they can. The first few bids are precious.The first debt trades on yield, then bid lists come in and trade on price, and finally not at all in the worst of markets. Never say hope is a strategy, because at this stage, strategy is both hope and prayers. Real panic sets in when there are no bids at all and liquidity evaporates. Defaults no one saw coming set in to the point where everything trades like it is going out of business. Panic has manifested itself.
You never know how far these things go but these bad environments take on a life of their own. They change how those involved see themselves, their businesses and the risk they have really taken on. They change the man.
This cycle appears to have just begun. A lot depends on how far it goes.
The particular corner of the "Everything Bubble" that is the Private Credit Ponzi is based on "mark to fantasy".
So they created a firm based on absurdly inflated expectations and then named it “Infinite Commerce”?
Was “Caveat Emptor Enterprises” already taken?
Whatever else can be said, the honesty may have insulated themselves from a fraud allegation
SHTF for regional banks is coming now, or not. But you are correct in your premise my friend.
Hard to imagine a $25MM note lacked any recoverable collateral at all. Maybe the cost and delay of recovery nets a zero.
The holders of private credit notes and shares waded into their positions looking for above market yields. To provide this required the borrowers to pay above market rates. No borrower who can find a lower rate would do this. The choice to pay more comes from a general market assessment that the risk is too great. So it's a fundamental reality that the higher rates paid to investors come at the inescapable cost of greater risk.
The private credit bundlers sell, apparently, to buyers without the scale to do meaningful due diligence on the individual risks their money is exposed to. But the larger forces of Mr. Market signaled possible trouble in the better returns promised. These are grown ups, one would hope, and they understand that long lockups mean untimely redemptions might come at a penalty.
Can you give an example or two?