I think there is one important risk missing from this thought experiment: revaluing gold may dramatically change the government’s balance sheet, but it does nothing by itself to fix the underlying “income statement.”
The accumulated debt is a stock; the fiscal deficit is a flow. You can use a one-off gold revaluation to restructure, monetise, or even theoretically eliminate a huge portion of the existing debt. Still, if the government keeps running large structural deficits afterwards, the same problem begins accumulating again.
It’s like recapitalising a chronically loss-making company. You can inject enough capital to make its balance sheet look pristine overnight. Still, if the underlying business continues losing money every year, eventually those losses show up on the balance sheet again. You have bought time, not fixed the business model.
There may even be a moral-hazard problem here. If a massive gold revaluation creates trillions of dollars of apparent fiscal breathing room, it could reduce the political pressure to address the underlying deficit and actually encourage policymakers to spend more. In that case, the healthier balance sheet could indirectly contribute to an even worse “income statement.”
So to me the key question isn’t only what price Treasury could assign to its gold, or how much existing debt that could theoretically neutralize. It’s what happens the day after the reset.
Unless the rules and incentives that continuously generate the deficits change, a gold revaluation addresses the symptom—the accumulated stock of debt—without necessarily addressing the mechanism that created it. Eventually, the unhealthy income statement will find its way back onto the balance sheet.
technically right, but practically if they kick the debt-can back to debt-gdp numbers of pre-1980s we've rewound almost 50 years of deficit growth. And every year of those 50 had its deficit hysterics back to Reagan 1980s -- none of those forecasts of doom ever occurred. Betting on deficit hell was the worst trade of the 20th century and the 21st (so far, barring a nice gold run recently).
And the new post-gold restructuring flow is relative to a much smaller stock.
Like a water pipe running into a full swimming pool and overflowing vs. a water pipe running into an empty swimming pool.
Also, deficits feed directly into economy and boost corporate profits -- lots of deficit spending goes to private sector goods/services including to all the lobbying Fortune 500s. It's not like the federal govt loses money through deficits. The govt create assets in the form of Treasury bills and bonds, which investors buy. And even those pay interest income which also gets spent into economy. So the same people (investors) who pay the interest expense as citizens/taxpayers receive it back as investors.
There are lots of accounting perspectives and multi-path money flows -- the net result isn't clearly deterministic in the sense of math solutions. It's a very high dimensional analysis with lots of uncertainty and no optimal state.
Sir, I beg to differ. I think the swimming-pool analogy is precisely where our views diverge, because it makes the continuing flow of deficits appear essentially harmless as long as the pool has sufficient capacity.
If we assume, for the sake of argument, that a gold revaluation could substantially reduce the existing debt burden and return debt/GDP to the level of fifty years ago, we still have not actually “rewound” fifty years. We have reset one number on the government's balance sheet. We cannot go back in time and annul the economic consequences of the policies pursued during those fifty years. Whatever resource misallocation, monetary distortion, malinvestment, redistribution or institutional changes those policies produced are already embedded in today's economy. We would therefore begin the supposedly new fifty-year period from a very different economic starting point than the first.
That is why I prefer the analogy of a chronically loss-making company. Imagine a company that has accumulated enormous liabilities after decades of operating losses. Then, one morning, an asset on its balance sheet is revalued upward by enough to extinguish those accumulated liabilities. Its balance sheet suddenly looks wonderful.
But what has happened to its income statement?
If the company continues losing money every year, the underlying business has not been repaired. The recapitalisation has eliminated accumulated liabilities and bought time, but the same operating process immediately begins degrading the repaired balance sheet again. Worse, management may feel considerably less pressure to change its behaviour precisely because the balance sheet suddenly looks healthy.
I see three fundamental problems with treating government deficits as harmless water slowly refilling an emptied pool.
First, government spending itself is not neutral. I grew up in socialist Hungary and saw firsthand why I am reluctant to regard government as an efficient owner and allocator of scarce resources. Government expenditure commands real labour, capital, energy and materials. The fact that this spending becomes somebody else's revenue—or increases corporate profits—does not tell us what those resources would have produced in alternative uses. The opportunity cost does not disappear because the expenditure raises measured income elsewhere.
Second, the method of financing is not neutral either. Debt issuance and monetary accommodation do not simply move numbers between balance sheets. New money and credit enter through particular channels and at particular times, affecting relative prices and redistributing purchasing power—the Cantillon effect. They can distort interest-rate signals and the structure of production, encourage malinvestment, and potentially have much broader long-term economic and social consequences. These effects occur while the deficits are being financed, not fifty years later when some debt/GDP threshold is reached.
Third, I don't think we should confuse financial claims with real wealth. A Treasury bond is certainly an asset to its holder. But it is simultaneously a government liability and, ultimately, a financial claim on future production. Creating another trillion dollars of Treasury securities does not create another trillion dollars of factories, machines, energy, housing or productive capacity.
In fact, these three points reinforce one another. If government borrows resources and employs them less productively than they would otherwise have been employed, we can end up with more financial claims on future production while having less real productive capacity than we otherwise would have had. The Treasury asset on an investor's balance sheet does not make that problem disappear.
The same applies to the observation that taxpayers pay interest that investors then receive. That describes financial flows, but it does not establish economic neutrality. Accounting tells us where the claims and payments appear; it does not tell us whether scarce resources were allocated productively, whether monetary signals were distorted, or whether additional real wealth was created.
This is why I don't find the swimming-pool analogy persuasive. It suggests that after emptying the pool we can start filling it again and perhaps enjoy another fifty years before we need to worry.
But we cannot reset history along with the debt/GDP ratio. And the economic consequences of the next fifty years would not suddenly begin when the pool became full; they would occur throughout the process of filling it.
A gold revaluation may, under the assumptions of this thought experiment, repair the balance sheet. But unless something changes in the fiscal regime, it does not repair the income statement. And if the newly pristine balance sheet reduces the pressure to change the loss-making operation, the reset could even encourage more of the behaviour that made the reset necessary.
That doesn't require predicting an imminent debt crisis or claiming that some particular debt/GDP ratio inevitably produces catastrophe. My point is narrower: resetting accumulated liabilities is not the same thing as correcting the process that continuously creates them, and resetting a balance sheet is certainly not the same thing as resetting fifty years of economic history.
You can recapitalise a loss-making enterprise. You have not thereby made it profitable.
Agreed society can’t kick that can forever. And all your objections are very solid — part of that high dimensional function I referenced that models the phenomenon. Perhaps my primary push back is I think a gold reval could show some of the intellectual inconsistencies among the federal-debts-are-an-asteroid that threatens our economic life. The hypnotic quality of the debt-to-GDP numbers would be reduced. But good points you make. No disagreement that they are key parts of the political economy construct. Although I think calling govt “loss making enterprise” isn’t analytically correct since its “losses” directly fund profits in the corporate sector. It’s the ensemble rather than than one or the other part that I think is the issue.
I think we may actually be getting fairly close, although I also think the ground has shifted somewhat.
First, I should clarify that I never made the “federal-debt-is-an-asteroid” argument. I have never argued that debt-to-GDP is some magic number, nor that a particular ratio mechanically triggers economic calamity.
Since you raise the issue, I'm very reluctant to attach such significance to any particular debt-to-GDP threshold. If we are going to ask what ultimately constrains sovereign indebtedness, I suspect confidence ultimately matters more than crossing some predetermined numerical line. A monetary and sovereign-debt system can continue functioning for a very long time while people remain willing to hold its liabilities and trust the institutional arrangement behind them. If that confidence is seriously impaired, however, the adjustment need not be gradual. I certainly don't pretend to know when that might happen, or at what debt-to-GDP ratio—if any.
So on your narrower point about the “hypnotic quality” of debt-to-GDP, I may actually agree with you. If gold can be revalued by legislative/accounting action and the debt ratio consequently transformed while the country's factories, machines, skills, energy resources and productive capacity remain essentially unchanged, that is a rather nice demonstration that the financial ratio itself is not the underlying economic reality.
But that was never my objection to the gold revaluation.
I objected that changing the stock does not change the process producing the flow. Even granting the revaluation completely for the sake of argument, everything I raised earlier remains: the opportunity cost of government spending, the allocation of scarce resources, the monetary and Cantillon effects of financing, malinvestment, political incentives and moral hazard. Nor can a balance-sheet operation retrospectively undo the consequences of decades of previous allocation decisions. We cannot literally rewind economic history by resetting a financial ratio.
That is what I meant by the loss-making-enterprise analogy. Obviously, government is not literally a corporation and does not have a corporate P&L. The analogy was narrower: you can recapitalise an enterprise and make its balance sheet pristine without changing the process that caused it to deteriorate. If that process continues, the problem eventually returns.
Where I think we still genuinely disagree is the proposition that government “losses” directly fund corporate profits.
I suspect you are not making the narrower Kaleckian accounting point here, but it is worth separating the two. In the Kalecki profit equation, holding the other sectoral positions constant, a larger government budget deficit appears as a corresponding addition to aggregate corporate profits. As an accounting identity, I do not quarrel with that. (And, viewed through that accounting lens, perhaps it is not entirely surprising that corporate profits rose so sharply in the extraordinary fiscal environment following 2020.)
But an accounting identity does not explain where real resources come from, nor does it tell us whether wealth has been created.
Government spending certainly becomes somebody's income or revenue, and sometimes somebody's profit. But looking only at that side of the transaction leaves out the rather important question of where government's command over those resources came from in the first place.
If I take $100 from you and then spend $50 buying something from you, my $50 expenditure really is revenue to you. But it would be rather rich for me to present myself as Santa Claus because my spending “supported your income,” while quietly leaving out the first transaction.
The fact that the actual fiscal system is vastly more complicated does not remove the underlying constraint. Government cannot command scarce real resources without someone else bearing the corresponding economic cost, whether through taxation, borrowing, monetary dilution, or diverting resources from alternative uses. The financing mechanism changes who bears that cost, when, and in what form; it does not abolish scarcity or opportunity cost.
That is why I think it is dangerous to move too quickly from “government deficit” to “corporate profit” and conclude that we have thereby described the economic effect. We have described a financial relationship. We have not answered what happened to the underlying labour, capital, energy and materials; what their alternative uses would have been; or whether the resulting allocation increased or diminished productive capacity.
So I agree with you that the “ensemble” matters. I would only insist that the ensemble has to include more than the financial flows between government and the corporate sector. It also has to include the scarce real resources underneath those flows, their alternative uses, the incentives created by the method of financing, and the resulting capital structure.
Otherwise, I fear we risk confusing the circulation of financial claims with wealth creation.
If the liberals gain control again and this idea perks its way up the food chain, don’t rule it out. Both sides of the aisle have a huge spending problem, but the left side is always willing to press the envelope with bad ideas. They’re silly enough to see this as their answer to every spending problem and every hairbrained idea that’s ever crossed their path.
And of course, should this actually happen, they’ll be sure to tax any gains at something like 95%. 🤔
Looking at total federal debt-to-GDP since Nixon closed the gold window, and comparing the parties controlling the presidency, House, and Senate, I have considerable difficulty identifying which side of the aisle is supposed to be fiscally responsible. The debt ratchet seems remarkably bipartisan.
Perhaps Milton and Rose Friedman identified the more fundamental problem: modern politics has perfected “the technique of buying votes with the voters’ own money.”
That incentive, unfortunately, does not appear to carry a party affiliation.
I’m all for it, of course. But I find it hard to imagine finding a dealer who would hand over $100,000 when I walk in with a maple leaf. Certainly not in the near term. And extending the thought experiment, we all know what happened to Americans’ gold the last time the government played with devaluation of the currency relative to gold. Or, “can’t allow windfalls”, so the tax bill would be enormous. Wouldn’t be the first time the government taxed inflation. It’s a profitable scam.
There's some interesting calculations you can do with the price of gold.
In 1966, the price of gold was $35.40. Today it's $4374 or 124x higher.
Since then, nominal GDP has grown from $813.4B to $32.49T or about 40x. That means that US GDP measured in gold has fallen by 2/3 in the past 60 years. Per capita it's more like an 80% drop. It's far worse at $155K / oz.
The gold of a minimum wage worker in 1966 would be worth enough to be in the richest 5% of households today. That's how much the dollar's fallen.
Your observation is important, and it ties into the fact that one middle class job no longer is sufficient to sustain a family and buy a home. The majority of Americans and Westerners are poorer now than they were back then, demonstrated by the need for two income families to buy what one income bought back then.
Please, if gold goes anywhere near 10K i promise that our trustworthy government will confiscate our assets faster than you could say “ land of the free”
For me, the interesting question would be: Why would anyone care what value some government declares an ounce of gold to be worth? Right now, the market ignores $42.00/ounce. Why would the market suddenly respect $10,000, $50,000, $150,000?
Only problem is there has never been a full independent audit of the gold held by the US treasury. We don’t really know how much gold is held by the US treasury and what the quality is of that gold. some of that gold is probably melted down junk gold of unknown purity confiscated by Roosevelt in the 30s. Since the government has resisted calls for an independent audit and Trump, who called for an audit in 2025 and is now silent on the subject, one has to ask themselves why.
Only the silly government can distort reality and pretend it doesn't matter. Why not $200K? That "extra" $45k could go toward paying citizens a major windfall that could be used to shore up the economy. It wouldn't matter to the retail gold/silver markets as the current $42.22 doesn't mean anything. Then again, who is going to pay $155K for an ounce of gold? It would have to be some phony credit maneuvering that when the time came wouldn't stand up to market reality.
I like it because I have a gold coin in my closet though it is more because I think the Indian Head / Buffalo one looks cool. I also bought some 1 oz silver "bitcoin" and "ethereum" for fun.
Perhaps the 155k is out there, but I always thought it was weird the reserves are still priced as if it were 80 years ago. In the least, they should get those marked up to modern reality. It won't solve the problems but at least provides a more realistic valuation on current assets.
I actually really like creative thought experiments like this, as they are fun to write about and debate.
But the end result of all these types of things is that you ultimately come to the "there is no free lunch" principle of Austrian economics.
Just like minting a $1 trillion platinum coin, no wealth was created with this idea.
Ultimately what needs to happen is that the government needs to start extracting less wealth from the private sector and wasting it. The private sector and free markets will always find a better use for our existing wealth, thus creating more wealth.
I think we passed the point of a healthy balance between government extraction of private wealth a very long time ago.
So Gold's real value, G, can be valued in the range $44.20 < G < $155,000. We are clearly already in that range with a spot price of $4410.90.
So do goofy U.S. Treasury paper shenanigans pull G in a positive long-term direction for holders of gold? I suppose that by blowing up the global economy and destroying USD, that would be yes.
But there are a bazillion more-likely ways for the USD to continue its long-term decline. What are we even talking about here?
Interesting thought experiment! But won't work for many reasons.
- Why would the Fed buy at 155k when the market price is around 5k? It would immediately result in an unrealized loss of $40 trillion, making the Fed insolvent basically for eternity (the MV loss from its SOMA portfolio ist "just" 844 billions). And consider, once the money is in circulation, there's no way for the Fed to ever pull it back again (because collateral is just 5k/ once vs. 155k buy price).
- it would be balance sheet expansion 5 times larger than all QEs combined. Fed Chair Warsh has committed to unwind B/S, and the evidence is that QEs/ ample reserves were the single worst economic policy of all time. No way he agrees. QEs, by the way, are also the key reason for today's massive overvaluation in the stock market.
- It wouldn't be "maybe inflation a little higher", but the worst case of hyperinflation in the modern era.
So under this scenario, cash would crash. A dollar would be worth a few cents of Present Value. Savings Bonds and T-Bills would crash in value (except for I-bonds). The US stock market would probably just recalibrate at these higher multiples if lenders recalibrate in sync with them.
Tax rate tables would need to be redone. All in all, some people would be relatively OK while savers, retirees and most others would be decimated. I really do think Bessent's plan is somewhere along these lines, as he did say years ago that he had a plan to reset the markets. But he also said the hard part was protecting savers and the elderly. He said he had a plan for that.
The scheme to revalue gold to current market value has been floated for a while, but a trillion more on the books won't dent the debt. Therefore I believe gold revaluation is only part of his complex plan. I think it includes his Fiscal side coordinated with Warsh's Monetary side, but I still cannot see the plan.
Hyperinflation by proxy. Proxy being a magical gold price. How about we just roll back tax breaks for 1%ers to 1999 levels. You know, last time the budget balanced. Doing that eliminates 1/2 the non-interest deficit.
From there, have corps with $100m+ in revs (there’s 35-40k of them) pay for Medicare-for-all on a 90/10 plan, i.e. citizens on the hook for 10% of healthcare costs or a Medicare supplement. That balances most of the rest of the non-interest budget presuming we don’t really blowout military spending again.
one other point to consider if the price of gold would be done like this. What then happens to the price of silver, platinum, copper, the rare earth elements? All of these are used in products we consume every day. Those prices would also rise forcing the prices to increase proportionately on cars cell phones, computer equipment, most everything the DOD buys these days, and countless other things we use everyday. If wages dont keep pace, very few will be sold, unemployment would rise as a result.
I think there is one important risk missing from this thought experiment: revaluing gold may dramatically change the government’s balance sheet, but it does nothing by itself to fix the underlying “income statement.”
The accumulated debt is a stock; the fiscal deficit is a flow. You can use a one-off gold revaluation to restructure, monetise, or even theoretically eliminate a huge portion of the existing debt. Still, if the government keeps running large structural deficits afterwards, the same problem begins accumulating again.
It’s like recapitalising a chronically loss-making company. You can inject enough capital to make its balance sheet look pristine overnight. Still, if the underlying business continues losing money every year, eventually those losses show up on the balance sheet again. You have bought time, not fixed the business model.
There may even be a moral-hazard problem here. If a massive gold revaluation creates trillions of dollars of apparent fiscal breathing room, it could reduce the political pressure to address the underlying deficit and actually encourage policymakers to spend more. In that case, the healthier balance sheet could indirectly contribute to an even worse “income statement.”
So to me the key question isn’t only what price Treasury could assign to its gold, or how much existing debt that could theoretically neutralize. It’s what happens the day after the reset.
Unless the rules and incentives that continuously generate the deficits change, a gold revaluation addresses the symptom—the accumulated stock of debt—without necessarily addressing the mechanism that created it. Eventually, the unhealthy income statement will find its way back onto the balance sheet.
technically right, but practically if they kick the debt-can back to debt-gdp numbers of pre-1980s we've rewound almost 50 years of deficit growth. And every year of those 50 had its deficit hysterics back to Reagan 1980s -- none of those forecasts of doom ever occurred. Betting on deficit hell was the worst trade of the 20th century and the 21st (so far, barring a nice gold run recently).
And the new post-gold restructuring flow is relative to a much smaller stock.
Like a water pipe running into a full swimming pool and overflowing vs. a water pipe running into an empty swimming pool.
Also, deficits feed directly into economy and boost corporate profits -- lots of deficit spending goes to private sector goods/services including to all the lobbying Fortune 500s. It's not like the federal govt loses money through deficits. The govt create assets in the form of Treasury bills and bonds, which investors buy. And even those pay interest income which also gets spent into economy. So the same people (investors) who pay the interest expense as citizens/taxpayers receive it back as investors.
There are lots of accounting perspectives and multi-path money flows -- the net result isn't clearly deterministic in the sense of math solutions. It's a very high dimensional analysis with lots of uncertainty and no optimal state.
Sir, I beg to differ. I think the swimming-pool analogy is precisely where our views diverge, because it makes the continuing flow of deficits appear essentially harmless as long as the pool has sufficient capacity.
If we assume, for the sake of argument, that a gold revaluation could substantially reduce the existing debt burden and return debt/GDP to the level of fifty years ago, we still have not actually “rewound” fifty years. We have reset one number on the government's balance sheet. We cannot go back in time and annul the economic consequences of the policies pursued during those fifty years. Whatever resource misallocation, monetary distortion, malinvestment, redistribution or institutional changes those policies produced are already embedded in today's economy. We would therefore begin the supposedly new fifty-year period from a very different economic starting point than the first.
That is why I prefer the analogy of a chronically loss-making company. Imagine a company that has accumulated enormous liabilities after decades of operating losses. Then, one morning, an asset on its balance sheet is revalued upward by enough to extinguish those accumulated liabilities. Its balance sheet suddenly looks wonderful.
But what has happened to its income statement?
If the company continues losing money every year, the underlying business has not been repaired. The recapitalisation has eliminated accumulated liabilities and bought time, but the same operating process immediately begins degrading the repaired balance sheet again. Worse, management may feel considerably less pressure to change its behaviour precisely because the balance sheet suddenly looks healthy.
I see three fundamental problems with treating government deficits as harmless water slowly refilling an emptied pool.
First, government spending itself is not neutral. I grew up in socialist Hungary and saw firsthand why I am reluctant to regard government as an efficient owner and allocator of scarce resources. Government expenditure commands real labour, capital, energy and materials. The fact that this spending becomes somebody else's revenue—or increases corporate profits—does not tell us what those resources would have produced in alternative uses. The opportunity cost does not disappear because the expenditure raises measured income elsewhere.
Second, the method of financing is not neutral either. Debt issuance and monetary accommodation do not simply move numbers between balance sheets. New money and credit enter through particular channels and at particular times, affecting relative prices and redistributing purchasing power—the Cantillon effect. They can distort interest-rate signals and the structure of production, encourage malinvestment, and potentially have much broader long-term economic and social consequences. These effects occur while the deficits are being financed, not fifty years later when some debt/GDP threshold is reached.
Third, I don't think we should confuse financial claims with real wealth. A Treasury bond is certainly an asset to its holder. But it is simultaneously a government liability and, ultimately, a financial claim on future production. Creating another trillion dollars of Treasury securities does not create another trillion dollars of factories, machines, energy, housing or productive capacity.
In fact, these three points reinforce one another. If government borrows resources and employs them less productively than they would otherwise have been employed, we can end up with more financial claims on future production while having less real productive capacity than we otherwise would have had. The Treasury asset on an investor's balance sheet does not make that problem disappear.
The same applies to the observation that taxpayers pay interest that investors then receive. That describes financial flows, but it does not establish economic neutrality. Accounting tells us where the claims and payments appear; it does not tell us whether scarce resources were allocated productively, whether monetary signals were distorted, or whether additional real wealth was created.
This is why I don't find the swimming-pool analogy persuasive. It suggests that after emptying the pool we can start filling it again and perhaps enjoy another fifty years before we need to worry.
But we cannot reset history along with the debt/GDP ratio. And the economic consequences of the next fifty years would not suddenly begin when the pool became full; they would occur throughout the process of filling it.
A gold revaluation may, under the assumptions of this thought experiment, repair the balance sheet. But unless something changes in the fiscal regime, it does not repair the income statement. And if the newly pristine balance sheet reduces the pressure to change the loss-making operation, the reset could even encourage more of the behaviour that made the reset necessary.
That doesn't require predicting an imminent debt crisis or claiming that some particular debt/GDP ratio inevitably produces catastrophe. My point is narrower: resetting accumulated liabilities is not the same thing as correcting the process that continuously creates them, and resetting a balance sheet is certainly not the same thing as resetting fifty years of economic history.
You can recapitalise a loss-making enterprise. You have not thereby made it profitable.
Agreed society can’t kick that can forever. And all your objections are very solid — part of that high dimensional function I referenced that models the phenomenon. Perhaps my primary push back is I think a gold reval could show some of the intellectual inconsistencies among the federal-debts-are-an-asteroid that threatens our economic life. The hypnotic quality of the debt-to-GDP numbers would be reduced. But good points you make. No disagreement that they are key parts of the political economy construct. Although I think calling govt “loss making enterprise” isn’t analytically correct since its “losses” directly fund profits in the corporate sector. It’s the ensemble rather than than one or the other part that I think is the issue.
I think we may actually be getting fairly close, although I also think the ground has shifted somewhat.
First, I should clarify that I never made the “federal-debt-is-an-asteroid” argument. I have never argued that debt-to-GDP is some magic number, nor that a particular ratio mechanically triggers economic calamity.
Since you raise the issue, I'm very reluctant to attach such significance to any particular debt-to-GDP threshold. If we are going to ask what ultimately constrains sovereign indebtedness, I suspect confidence ultimately matters more than crossing some predetermined numerical line. A monetary and sovereign-debt system can continue functioning for a very long time while people remain willing to hold its liabilities and trust the institutional arrangement behind them. If that confidence is seriously impaired, however, the adjustment need not be gradual. I certainly don't pretend to know when that might happen, or at what debt-to-GDP ratio—if any.
So on your narrower point about the “hypnotic quality” of debt-to-GDP, I may actually agree with you. If gold can be revalued by legislative/accounting action and the debt ratio consequently transformed while the country's factories, machines, skills, energy resources and productive capacity remain essentially unchanged, that is a rather nice demonstration that the financial ratio itself is not the underlying economic reality.
But that was never my objection to the gold revaluation.
I objected that changing the stock does not change the process producing the flow. Even granting the revaluation completely for the sake of argument, everything I raised earlier remains: the opportunity cost of government spending, the allocation of scarce resources, the monetary and Cantillon effects of financing, malinvestment, political incentives and moral hazard. Nor can a balance-sheet operation retrospectively undo the consequences of decades of previous allocation decisions. We cannot literally rewind economic history by resetting a financial ratio.
That is what I meant by the loss-making-enterprise analogy. Obviously, government is not literally a corporation and does not have a corporate P&L. The analogy was narrower: you can recapitalise an enterprise and make its balance sheet pristine without changing the process that caused it to deteriorate. If that process continues, the problem eventually returns.
Where I think we still genuinely disagree is the proposition that government “losses” directly fund corporate profits.
I suspect you are not making the narrower Kaleckian accounting point here, but it is worth separating the two. In the Kalecki profit equation, holding the other sectoral positions constant, a larger government budget deficit appears as a corresponding addition to aggregate corporate profits. As an accounting identity, I do not quarrel with that. (And, viewed through that accounting lens, perhaps it is not entirely surprising that corporate profits rose so sharply in the extraordinary fiscal environment following 2020.)
But an accounting identity does not explain where real resources come from, nor does it tell us whether wealth has been created.
Government spending certainly becomes somebody's income or revenue, and sometimes somebody's profit. But looking only at that side of the transaction leaves out the rather important question of where government's command over those resources came from in the first place.
If I take $100 from you and then spend $50 buying something from you, my $50 expenditure really is revenue to you. But it would be rather rich for me to present myself as Santa Claus because my spending “supported your income,” while quietly leaving out the first transaction.
The fact that the actual fiscal system is vastly more complicated does not remove the underlying constraint. Government cannot command scarce real resources without someone else bearing the corresponding economic cost, whether through taxation, borrowing, monetary dilution, or diverting resources from alternative uses. The financing mechanism changes who bears that cost, when, and in what form; it does not abolish scarcity or opportunity cost.
That is why I think it is dangerous to move too quickly from “government deficit” to “corporate profit” and conclude that we have thereby described the economic effect. We have described a financial relationship. We have not answered what happened to the underlying labour, capital, energy and materials; what their alternative uses would have been; or whether the resulting allocation increased or diminished productive capacity.
So I agree with you that the “ensemble” matters. I would only insist that the ensemble has to include more than the financial flows between government and the corporate sector. It also has to include the scarce real resources underneath those flows, their alternative uses, the incentives created by the method of financing, and the resulting capital structure.
Otherwise, I fear we risk confusing the circulation of financial claims with wealth creation.
If the liberals gain control again and this idea perks its way up the food chain, don’t rule it out. Both sides of the aisle have a huge spending problem, but the left side is always willing to press the envelope with bad ideas. They’re silly enough to see this as their answer to every spending problem and every hairbrained idea that’s ever crossed their path.
And of course, should this actually happen, they’ll be sure to tax any gains at something like 95%. 🤔
Looking at total federal debt-to-GDP since Nixon closed the gold window, and comparing the parties controlling the presidency, House, and Senate, I have considerable difficulty identifying which side of the aisle is supposed to be fiscally responsible. The debt ratchet seems remarkably bipartisan.
Perhaps Milton and Rose Friedman identified the more fundamental problem: modern politics has perfected “the technique of buying votes with the voters’ own money.”
That incentive, unfortunately, does not appear to carry a party affiliation.
I’m all for it, of course. But I find it hard to imagine finding a dealer who would hand over $100,000 when I walk in with a maple leaf. Certainly not in the near term. And extending the thought experiment, we all know what happened to Americans’ gold the last time the government played with devaluation of the currency relative to gold. Or, “can’t allow windfalls”, so the tax bill would be enormous. Wouldn’t be the first time the government taxed inflation. It’s a profitable scam.
There's some interesting calculations you can do with the price of gold.
In 1966, the price of gold was $35.40. Today it's $4374 or 124x higher.
Since then, nominal GDP has grown from $813.4B to $32.49T or about 40x. That means that US GDP measured in gold has fallen by 2/3 in the past 60 years. Per capita it's more like an 80% drop. It's far worse at $155K / oz.
The gold of a minimum wage worker in 1966 would be worth enough to be in the richest 5% of households today. That's how much the dollar's fallen.
Your observation is important, and it ties into the fact that one middle class job no longer is sufficient to sustain a family and buy a home. The majority of Americans and Westerners are poorer now than they were back then, demonstrated by the need for two income families to buy what one income bought back then.
Please, if gold goes anywhere near 10K i promise that our trustworthy government will confiscate our assets faster than you could say “ land of the free”
For me, the interesting question would be: Why would anyone care what value some government declares an ounce of gold to be worth? Right now, the market ignores $42.00/ounce. Why would the market suddenly respect $10,000, $50,000, $150,000?
Only problem is there has never been a full independent audit of the gold held by the US treasury. We don’t really know how much gold is held by the US treasury and what the quality is of that gold. some of that gold is probably melted down junk gold of unknown purity confiscated by Roosevelt in the 30s. Since the government has resisted calls for an independent audit and Trump, who called for an audit in 2025 and is now silent on the subject, one has to ask themselves why.
Only the silly government can distort reality and pretend it doesn't matter. Why not $200K? That "extra" $45k could go toward paying citizens a major windfall that could be used to shore up the economy. It wouldn't matter to the retail gold/silver markets as the current $42.22 doesn't mean anything. Then again, who is going to pay $155K for an ounce of gold? It would have to be some phony credit maneuvering that when the time came wouldn't stand up to market reality.
I like it because I have a gold coin in my closet though it is more because I think the Indian Head / Buffalo one looks cool. I also bought some 1 oz silver "bitcoin" and "ethereum" for fun.
Perhaps the 155k is out there, but I always thought it was weird the reserves are still priced as if it were 80 years ago. In the least, they should get those marked up to modern reality. It won't solve the problems but at least provides a more realistic valuation on current assets.
I actually really like creative thought experiments like this, as they are fun to write about and debate.
But the end result of all these types of things is that you ultimately come to the "there is no free lunch" principle of Austrian economics.
Just like minting a $1 trillion platinum coin, no wealth was created with this idea.
Ultimately what needs to happen is that the government needs to start extracting less wealth from the private sector and wasting it. The private sector and free markets will always find a better use for our existing wealth, thus creating more wealth.
I think we passed the point of a healthy balance between government extraction of private wealth a very long time ago.
We have to reduce spending, and dramatically so.
So Gold's real value, G, can be valued in the range $44.20 < G < $155,000. We are clearly already in that range with a spot price of $4410.90.
So do goofy U.S. Treasury paper shenanigans pull G in a positive long-term direction for holders of gold? I suppose that by blowing up the global economy and destroying USD, that would be yes.
But there are a bazillion more-likely ways for the USD to continue its long-term decline. What are we even talking about here?
Interesting thought experiment! But won't work for many reasons.
- Why would the Fed buy at 155k when the market price is around 5k? It would immediately result in an unrealized loss of $40 trillion, making the Fed insolvent basically for eternity (the MV loss from its SOMA portfolio ist "just" 844 billions). And consider, once the money is in circulation, there's no way for the Fed to ever pull it back again (because collateral is just 5k/ once vs. 155k buy price).
- it would be balance sheet expansion 5 times larger than all QEs combined. Fed Chair Warsh has committed to unwind B/S, and the evidence is that QEs/ ample reserves were the single worst economic policy of all time. No way he agrees. QEs, by the way, are also the key reason for today's massive overvaluation in the stock market.
- It wouldn't be "maybe inflation a little higher", but the worst case of hyperinflation in the modern era.
So under this scenario, cash would crash. A dollar would be worth a few cents of Present Value. Savings Bonds and T-Bills would crash in value (except for I-bonds). The US stock market would probably just recalibrate at these higher multiples if lenders recalibrate in sync with them.
Tax rate tables would need to be redone. All in all, some people would be relatively OK while savers, retirees and most others would be decimated. I really do think Bessent's plan is somewhere along these lines, as he did say years ago that he had a plan to reset the markets. But he also said the hard part was protecting savers and the elderly. He said he had a plan for that.
The scheme to revalue gold to current market value has been floated for a while, but a trillion more on the books won't dent the debt. Therefore I believe gold revaluation is only part of his complex plan. I think it includes his Fiscal side coordinated with Warsh's Monetary side, but I still cannot see the plan.
Shhhhh.... Stop giving them ideas!
Hyperinflation by proxy. Proxy being a magical gold price. How about we just roll back tax breaks for 1%ers to 1999 levels. You know, last time the budget balanced. Doing that eliminates 1/2 the non-interest deficit.
From there, have corps with $100m+ in revs (there’s 35-40k of them) pay for Medicare-for-all on a 90/10 plan, i.e. citizens on the hook for 10% of healthcare costs or a Medicare supplement. That balances most of the rest of the non-interest budget presuming we don’t really blowout military spending again.
Call it what you will. They’re still inflating away that debt.
one other point to consider if the price of gold would be done like this. What then happens to the price of silver, platinum, copper, the rare earth elements? All of these are used in products we consume every day. Those prices would also rise forcing the prices to increase proportionately on cars cell phones, computer equipment, most everything the DOD buys these days, and countless other things we use everyday. If wages dont keep pace, very few will be sold, unemployment would rise as a result.